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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this appeal, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (herein CCPA) and 
amicus, the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association (herein IP AA) allege that the District Court 
erred in granting Mr. Jamee Wade's (herein Mr. Wade or Respondent) public writings request 
per Title 9, Chapter Three of the Idaho Statutes, the Idaho Public Writings Act. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The CCPA appeals from the MEMORANDUM DECSION ON PETTION FOR 
ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS (R., pp.50-54) and the MEMORANDUM DECISION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT (R., pp. 99-102). Respondent asserts that the decisions of the 
District Court were correct and should be affirmed. 
A. The Course of Proceedings and Factual Background 
On December 22, 2011, Mr. Wade was shot twice and injured by a city of Fruitland 
Police Officer. Cognizant of the requirement that Mr. Wade had to file a tort claim on or before 
June 19, 2012, Mr. Wade, through counsel per Idaho Code Sections 9-337 - 9-347, requested 
copies of the completed Idaho State Police, Fruitland Police Department, and Payette County 
Sheriffs Department investigations into the officer involved shooting of Mr. Wade (R., pp. 27-
29). On March 30, 2012, the Respondent denied Mr. Wade's request relying on Idaho Code 
Section 9-335 without addressing the rationale for its decision (R., pp. 35-36). On April 19, 
2012, Mr. Wade, per Idaho Code Section 9-343(1), filed a Petition for Access to Public Records 
and requested an expedited hearing (R., pp. 3-38). On April 27, 2012, the Respondent filed an 
Answer to Mr. Wade's Petition (R., pp. 39-42). A brief hearing was held in Court on May 4, 
2012, which hearing was continued until May 17,2012 (R., p.1). At the May 17,2012, hearing, 
the Court concluded that it would be necessary for it to review the records contained in the 
1 
Respondent's file in camera (R., p.l). On June 5, 2012, the Court having completed its in 
camera review, issued its Memorandum Decision on Petition for Access to Public Records 
granting Mr. Wade's request and ordering the Respondent to make the record public and provide 
the same to Mr. Wade (R., pp. 50-34). On June 6, 2012, Appellant submitted its Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment (R., pp. 55-56). On June 12,2012, the Appellant filed its Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., pp. 63-82) wherein Appellant included in its 
"Factual & Procedural Background" section what it termed as its "generalized synopsis" based 
on "current reports and investigation." (R., pp. 63-82)1 On June 13, 2012, Appellant filed a 
Motion to Stay the Proceedings Pending Decision on Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., 
p. 1). On June 14, 2012, the Court issued its Order to Stay Proceeding Pending Decision on 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., p. 1). On June 14,2012, the Court issued a Notice of 
Hearing, which set June 28, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., as the time the Court would hear oral argument 
on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., p.1). On June 19,2012, Respondent 
submitted his response to Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R., pp. 83-96). After 
1 According to the CCPA's generalized synopsis, the following are the relevant events of the December 
22,2011, shooting of Mr. Wade by a Fruitland Police Officer: 
On December 22, 2011, the Idaho State Police (lSP) received a call regarding an officer involved 
shooting in New Plymouth, Idaho. The Fruitland police officer involved in the shooting had 
responded to a call of an intoxicated person making threats to kill his mother. Upon arrival, the 
Officer observed a white male (Mr. Wade) step out of a sports utility vehicle parked in the 
driveway and begin walking toward the officer's patrol car in an "aggressive and determined 
manner." The officer ordered the suspect to stop without success. The officer then ordered him 
to stop or "he would shoot." The suspect continued toward the officer stating "fucking do it then." 
The officer fired two rounds at the suspect, the suspect then grasped his chest and moaned before 
stumbling to the ground. The officer ordered the suspect to stay on the ground, to which the 
suspect responded "fuck you" and got to his feet. The officer then began to back pedal away from 
his patrol car in an attempt to create some distance and continued to give the suspect commands 
to remain on the ground. The suspect refused to comply and continued to pursue the officer, at 
this point the officer fired three additional rounds and the suspect fell to the ground. A second 
officer arrived on scene and the two officers secured the suspect and called emergency medical 
services. 
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hearing argument on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, the Court issued its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER UPON MOTION TO AL TER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT (R., pp. 99-102). The latter decision and order granted Mr. Wade's request; 
however, access was limited to Mr. Wade and Mr. Wade's counsel, the contents of which could 
not "be disclosed outside of the pending Tort Claim before Payette County or any subsequent 
civil litigation that may result from said tort claim" (R., pp. 102 and 109). On July 11, 2012, 
CCPA filed the present appeal (R., pp. 104-108). On July 20, 2012, the Court ordered that its 
June 29, 2012, memorandum decision and order be stayed pending the outcome of the present 
appeal (R., p.2). On October 5, 2012, the Court amended to its July 20, 2012, Judgment and 
made allowance for Mr. Wade to seek attorney fees in District Court at the conclusion of the 
present appeal (R., p. 111). On September 11, 2012, Mr. Wade filed a civil rights complaint in 
Federal Court (Dkt. 25., p. 4)? On November 7,2012, Mr. Wade served CCPA with a subpoena 
which sought among other items the complete investigative file compiled by Canyon County 
(Dkt. 25., p. 4). On December 6,2012, after the time had expired for CCPA to comply with the 
subpoena, CCPA filed a motion to quash the subpoena (Dkt. 25., p. 4). On December 11,2012, 
in response to a discovery request for production, the city of Fruitland produced its reports and 
records of the December 22,2011, officer involved shooting incident (Dkt. 25., p. 5). The latter 
request for production was identical to the March 22,2012, public records request (Dkt. 25., p. 5) 
and (R. p. 27). After reviewing briefs submitted by both Mr. Wade and the CCPA, the Federal 
District Court denied in part and granted in part the CCPA's motion to quash and issued its 
2 On January 31,2013, Respondent submitted his MOTION REQUESTING THAT THE COURT TAKE 
mDICIAL NOTICE ofDkt. 25 Memorandum Decision and Order, entered in Federal District Court Case 
No. 1:12-cv-00465-CWD, January 14, 2013, pursuant to I.A.R. 32(c) and I.R.E. 201. Respondent, 
anticipating a favorable ruling on the motion refers to subject Memorandum Decision and Order in this 
brief as Dkt. 25. 
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MEMORANDUM DECSION AND ORDER on January 14,2013, (Dkt. 25). Dkt. 25 provided 
that the complete investigative file compiled by the CCPA be produced; however, the disclosure 
would be limited to Mr. Wade and his legal counsel (Dkt., 25 p. 12). Thus through the discovery 
process, a process advocated by the Appellant, Mr. Wade has access to all of the documents 
requested from the CCPA through Mr. Wade's public writings request. 
B. Additional Issue on Appeal 
Does the Court Lack Jurisdiction to Hear The Present Appeal? 
C. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Respondent requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §§ 9-335(4), 9-344(2), 12-
121, and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). 
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ISSUES 
1. Does the Idaho Supreme Court Have Jurisdiction to Hear the Present Case on 
Appeal? 
2. Did the District Court Err by Ordering the Disclosure of a Police Investigation of an 
Officer-Involved Shooting While the Matter was Being Reviewed by the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney? 
5 
ARGUMENTS 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Hear the Present Case on 
Appeal as the Issues Presented by the CCP A are Moot. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of mootness is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time including the first 
time on appeal. Even when not raised by the parties, the Court has a duty to raise the issues of 
standing and mootness sua sponte. As the issue is jurisdictional, the Court exercises free review 
in making its decision as to whether an issue is moot which implicates the jurisdiction of the 
Court. See Arambarri v. Armstrong 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Idaho, 2012) 
citing Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd ofComm'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1227 
(2011); In re Doe 1, 145 Idaho 337, 340, 179 P.3d 300,303 (2008) and Johnson v. Blaine Cnty., 
146 Idaho 916, 924,204 P.3d 1127, 1135 (2009); In re Doe 1, 145 Idaho at 340, 179 P.3d at 303. 
1. The Issue of Whether the Court Erred in Granting Mr. Wade His 
Request Under the Idaho Public Records Act has Become Moot as the 
Questions Presented are No Longer at Issue and a Favorable Decision 
by this Court Could Not Grant the Relief Sought by the CCP A. 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court relying on developed jurisprudence addressed the 
question of when a case becomes moot. The Court found that: 
An issue is moot if it "does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable 
of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. 
Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849,851, 119 P.3d 624,626 (2005). An 
"issue is also moot if a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief or the 
party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." See Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227, 
91 P.3d at 1131. 
Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 739, 274 P.3d 1249, 1254 (Idaho,2012)3 
3 See also Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183 (U.S.Neb.,1982) which 
stated the following: 
In general, a case becomes moot "'when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties 
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.' " United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 
6 
The CCP A asserts in its brief that the District Court erred in its ruling that Mr. Wade was 
entitled to the public records that he sought. The CCP A in support of its position argues that the 
applicable statutes exempt investigatory records that are under prosecutorial review. The CCP A 
also argues that Idaho Public Records Act should not be used "as a way around discovery". The 
CCP A has asked on appeal that the decision of the District Court be reversed. Yet the record 
before this Court is clear, Mr. Wade, through the discovery process, has obtained access to all the 
documents sought by him through the Idaho Public Records Act. As noted herein, in response to 
a discovery request for production, the City of Fruitland produced its reports and records of the 
officer involved shooting incident (Dkt. 25., p. 5). The request for production was identical the 
March 22,2012, public records request (Dkt. 25., p. 5) and (R. p. 27). Later, through Dkt. 25, the 
complete investigative file compiled by the CCPA was ordered to be produced; however, the 
disclosure would be limited to Mr. Wade and his legal counsel (Dkt., 25 p. 12). Thus through 
the discovery process, a process advocated by the Appellant, Mr. Wade has access to all of the 
documents requested from the CCPA through Mr. Wade's public writings request. As noted in 
Arambarri v. Armstrong, supra, an issue is moot if a favorable judicial decision would not result 
in any relief. If this Court were to grant the relief sought by the Appellant, it would have no 
practical effect, as Mr. Wade has obtained or has access to all of the information requested in his 
public writings request. 
The appeal is also moot, as the CCP A has no cognizable interest in the outcome of the 
appeal. The only legal interest that CCP A had in the case was the non-disclosure of the 
investigatory records that they claimed were exempt. Once those documents were released 
445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208,63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), quoting Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 496,89 S.Ct. 1944, 1950,23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). 
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through discovery and by order of the Federal District Court, the CCPA had no other cognizable 
legal interest. The CCP A did not seek attorney fees nor did the CCP A represent a class of 
County Prosecutors or some other legally recognized class. 
11. The Present Appeal Does Not Meet Any of the Exceptions to the 
Mootness Doctrine that Would Allow This Court to Exercise Its 
Jurisdiction. 
Three established exceptions to the mootness doctrine allow a court to exercise its 
jurisdiction. Those three exceptions are: 
1. When there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person 
raising the issue; 
2. When the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of 
repetition; and 
3. When an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest. 
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851-852, 119 P.3d 624, 
626 - 627 (Idaho, 2005). 
a) The CCPA's Appeal Does Not Satisfy the First Exception to the Mootness Doctrine 
as no Cognizable Legal Consequences will be Imposed on the Appellant. 
Where a case or the principal issue in a case has become moot, it is sometimes possible 
for a plaintiff, or as in this case an appellant, to be entitled to some other form of relief. In these 
cases, judicial discretion must be exercised to prevent the exception from swallowing the 
mootness doctrine.4 The only cognizable legal interest that CCPA had in the present appeal is 
the non-disclosure of the investigatory records that they claimed were exempt. Once those 
4 "Judicial discretion must be exercised to limit the effectiveness of this argument to the unusual 
case, and appeals have been dismissed where the additional relief sought was found to be merely 
ancillary to the relief now impossible to grant. By including a count for damages in his original 
complaint, the plaintiff may be able to avoid the ancillary doctrine, which seems to have been 
applied only in cases in which the alternative relief was sought merely as an afterthought after 
the case had become moot. Applicable procedural rules must, of course, be consulted to 
determine the propriety of such joinder of legal and equitable relief. 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 772, 779 
(1955). See also Murphy v. Hunt 455 U.S. 478 at 482 
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documents were voluntarily released through discovery and by order of the Federal District 
Court through a subpoena, the CCP A had no other cognizable legal interest. No other ancillary 
relief was sought. 
b) The Second Exception to the Mootness Doctrine is Inapplicable as the Challenged 
Conduct is Not Likely to Evade Judicial Review and Thus be Capable of Repetition. 
The second exception to the mootness doctrine is limited to situations where there is a 
combination for two elements: "(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully 
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation or 
demonstrated probability that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action 
again." AMJUR APPELLATE § 602. 
The case of Us. v. Quattron, 402 F.3d 304 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2005) is a good example of the 
application of this rule. In Quattron, the press and other media organizations appealed an order 
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that prevented them, 
during pendency of criminal trial, from publishing the names of jurors disclosed in open court. 
The Court in trying to avoid a mistrial that had occurred in another case as a result of a juror's 
name becoming public, issued an order that no member of the press or other media were to 
divulge the names of any prospective or selected juror until the Court issued an order allowing 
the publication of the names. At a hearing on the record, the Court explained to media 
representatives that the restriction would cease the moment the trial ended. A coalition of media 
organizations appealed the Court's order. Prior to ruling on the merits of the appeal, the Court 
addressed the issue of its having jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Appellate Court noted that 
the underlying case had been resolved and the order lifted. The Appellate Court noted that the 
challenged action had been removed making the appeal moot. Properly applying the capable or 
repetition, yet evading review doctrine, the Court noted the following: 
9 
Despite this general rule of mootness, the instant appeal, like the appeal in 
Stewart, remains justiciable, because "the underlying dispute is 'capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.' " Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court, 478 U.S. 1,6,106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)). This exception to the 
mootness doctrine permits federal courts to decide a case where "(1) the 
challenged action was in duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its 
cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party will be subjected to the same action again." 
us. v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 2005). 
The underlying dispute in the present appeal is the release of investigatory records that 
the CCPA asserts should not have been released by the District Court in response to Mr. Wade's 
public writings request. Yet, it was through the very mechanism of discovery endorsed by the 
CCPA that Mr. Wade obtained documents and access to all the documents Mr. Wade requested 
in his public writings request making this appeal moot (App. Brief., pp.34-37 and 39) (R., pp.8 
and 80-81). Yet, had the CCP A taken advantage of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, it is 
doubtful that the present appeal would have become moot. 
In the present case, the CCP A could have taken the necessary steps to assert that the 
records requested to be produced in discovery were being withheld under Id. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) 
which provides protection from the release of privileged information through discovery of 
documents as follows: 
(5) (A) Privileged Information Withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise 
discoverable under these rules by claiming it is privileged or subject to protection as trial 
preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the 
nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a 
manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable 
other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection. 
(B) Privileged Information Produced. When a party produces information without 
intending to waive a claim of privilege it may, within a reasonable time, notify any party 
that received the information of its claim of privilege. After being notified, a party must 
promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies. The 
producing party must comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) with regard to the information and 
preserve it pending a ruling by the court. (Emphasis added) 
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In making its argument to the District Court, the CCP A never asserted that the records 
sought by Mr. Wade were privileged and therefore not subject to release. The only argument 
made by the CCP A to support the non-disclosure of the records being sought was that disclosure 
could possibly taint the testimony of Mr. Wade in a grand jury proceeding or preliminary 
hearing (R.pp.53, 100). It was not until the CCPA moved to quash the subpoena served upon 
them by Mr. Wade in case 1:12-cv-00465-CWD that the CCPA specifically asserted that the 
documents being required to be produced would require the disclosure of privileged information 
(Dkt. 25., pp. 2,7-8 ). The Federal District Court, for the same reason as the District Court, 
rejected the rationale of the CCPA for preventing the disclosure of the requested records. The 
Federal District Court found no privilege existed. Additionally, the Federal District Court noted 
that the CCPA failed to produce a privilege log for the Court's review (Dkt. 25., p.9 fn.5).5 
Therefore, had the CCP A taken the precaution of formally designating specific documents 
privileged, constructing a privilege log, and withholding the information requested per Id. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(5) no document would have been disclosed, prior to this Court's considering the 
present appeal. As the Federal District Court noted, "And, the cat is now out of the bag." The 
rules are established to ensure that a case such as the present does not avoid judicial review. The 
present case is moot not because rules allow repeated escape from judicial scrutiny. The present 
case is moot because the CCP A failed to take the necessary precautions to ensure that a favorable 
ruling on the issues presented for appeal could be concluded through a judicial decree of specific 
relief. 
5 The Federal District Court also noted that production of the documents through discovery 
process having occurred "could therefore deem the issue in a practical sense moot." The analysis 
herein shows that the issue is not only moot in a practical sense but is moot as a matter oflaw. 
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c) The Third Exception to the Mootness Doctrine is Inapplicable as the Moot Issue 
Does Not Satisfy the Test of Raising Concerns of Substantial Public Interest. 
The central issue presented in the present appeal is whether investigatory records under 
prosecutorial review are exempt from disclosure. Assuming that the central issue of the appeal is 
of substantial public interest, it is not an issue that the Court has not addressed. The case of 
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624, (Idaho, 
2005) is instructive. In Ameritel Inns, an election had been held with a questionable expenditure 
of public funds to campaign in favor of a bond issue. As the election had been held, the issue 
was moot. However, despite the apparent mootness of the issue, the Court considered the issue 
using the following rationale: 
The substantive issue presented in this case is whether public entities can use public 
funds to campaign in an election. That is an issue of substantial public interest that this 
Court has not yet addressed. We will therefore address the issue to provide guidance and 
direction in the future. (Emphasis added) 
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., at 852, 627. 
The present appeal does not meet the Ameritel test. Where overriding considerations of 
policy exist in regard to the releasing of investigatory records, the Idaho Courts have set forth 
the controlling rule of law. In doing so, the Court established an unambiguous guide for the 
future conduct of law enforcement bodies. The issue of when and under what circumstances 
investigatory records can be released under the Idaho Public Records Act has been addressed in 
detail; see Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787 (Idaho, 2003) and Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 
792 (Idaho, 2002). Therefore, the present case is not justiciable under the substantial public 
interest doctrine. 
There are four principal categories or classifications of cases that are considered 
sufficiently important to invoke the public policy interest exception to the mootness doctrine. 
The first classification consists of election matters. The second classification is those cases in 
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which the decisions of an administrative agency are challenged but the decisions become moot 
prior to reaching an appellate court. The third classification is when the question relates to local 
government powers and procedures such as when a municipal power under a state statute is 
questioned. The fourth classification involves questions of the constitutionality of a statute. 
These four classifications are discussed at length at 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 772, 788 -793 (1955). 
The issue central to the present appeal does not fit into any of the four principal classifications to 
invoke the public policy interest exception. 
2. Through its Interpretation of the Applicable Statute, The District Court Did Not Err By 
Ordering the Disclosure of a Police Investigation of an Officer-Involved Shooting While 
The Matter Was Being Reviewed by the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney. 
The standard of review in a case of statutory interpretation has been well settled: 
This Court exercises free review over questions of law, including the interpretation of a 
statute. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 
368, 146 P .3d 632, 634 (2006). Such an interpretation begins with the literal words of 
the statute, and "{wJhere the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." Id. If a 
statute is ambiguous, this Court attempts to ascertain the Legislature's intent by 
examining the "language used, the reasonableness of proposed interpretations, and the 
policy behind the statute." 
Wardv. PortneufMedical Center, Inc., 150 Idaho 501, 504, 248 P.3d 1236,1239 (Idaho, 
2011) citing Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 138 Idaho 
143,144,59 P.3d 314,315 (2002).6 
The primary issue before this Court IS whether the District Court erred in its 
interpretation of the Idaho Public Records Act. Contrary to the CCP A's assertions in its brief, 
there is sufficient case law regarding the standard of review. CCP A urges this Court to look 
outside of Idaho Law to interpret an Idaho Statute regarding the disclosure of investigatory 
records. However, Idaho has established sufficient case law to exercise its free review of Title 9, 
Chapter 3 cases to include the disclosure of investigatory records presented in this case. See 
6 See also Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794-795, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 - 1214 (Idaho, 2002) 
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Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 796-795, 53 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Idaho, 2002), Federated 
Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 915 P.2d 21 (Idaho, 1996). 
1. The Investigatory Records Under Prosecutorial Review Were Not Exempt From 
Disclosure; Therefore, the Court Did Not Err in Ordering the Disclosure. 
The documents and recordings requested by Mr. Wade were public records. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 9-338, the District Court correctly determined that Mr. Wade had a right to 
examine and take a copy of such records unless access to such records are expressly prohibited 
by statute. See Federated Publications, Inc. v. Boise City, 128 Idaho 459, 461, 915 P.2d 21,23 
(Idaho, 1996). Mr. Wade's request to the CCPA contained the following language: 
This request is being sent to you based upon the denial of my public writings 
request filed with the Payette County Prosecuting Attorney. The Payette County 
Prosecuting Attorney has informed me that all materials were forwarded to your 
office. Specifically, Ms. Kelso stated the following: 
I am in receipt of your public records request. Please note that this office 
is not in possession of any documents or items you have requested. Upon 
completion of the Idaho State Police Investigation, all materials were 
forwarded to the Canyon County Prosecutor's Officefor Review. I'm 
enclosing the letter sent to Canyon County. (Emphasis added) 
It is my understanding that the investigative effort of the lead investigative agency 
(the Idaho State Police) has been completed; see the enclosure to this 
correspondence. It is also my understanding that both the Fruitland Police 
Department's and the Payette County Sheriff s Office have been completed in this 
matter. Therefore, the exemption under I.C. 9-335(1) and 9-340B are inapplicable 
as providing the requested completed investigations would not: 
• Interfere with an enforcement proceeding; 
• Deprive, my client or the un-named officer of a fair trial; 
• Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
• Disclose the identity of a confidential source; nor the information provided 
by a confidential source; 
• Disclose investigative techniques and procedures; nor 
• Endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. 
(Exhibit "E") (R., p. 7). 
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The denial of Mr. Wade's request cited Idaho Code Section 9-335, which was 
inapplicable. The subject investigations had been completed and were only under review by the 
Canyon County Prosecutor. A review of other agencies' investigations, upon which the Canyon 
County Prosecutor could rely upon to make a charging decision, did not make the subject 
investigations completed by the Idaho State Police, the Fruitland Police Department, and the 
Payette County Sherriff's Office any less complete. Further, Mr. Wade had a right under Idaho 
Code to examine and make a copy of the subject requested records that were denied by the 
Canyon County Prosecutor. It must be noted that Idaho Code Sections 9-342(3)(a) and 9-
342(3)(b) are inapplicable as the documents requested unequivocally referred to completed 
investigations and associated public writings and not on-going investigations. In the Appellant's 
brief, the CCP A discusses at length how the disclosure of the requested records could or might 
affect a person receiving an impartial trial or adjudication and could or might constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy. However, this discussion is unpersuasive in light of the 
relevant unambiguous and mandatory language of the applicable statute which reads as follows: 
(1) Notwithstanding any statute or rule of court to the contrary, nothing in this chapter 
nor chapter 10, title 59, Idaho Code, shall be construed to require disclosure of 
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes by a law enforcement 
agency, but such exemption from disclosure applies only to the extent that the 
production o/such records would: 
(a) Interfere with enforcement proceedings; 
(b) Deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; 
(c) Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(d) Disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record 
compiled by a criminal law enforcement agency in the course of a criminal 
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source; 
(e) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or 
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(f) Endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. 
(3) An inactive investigatory record shall be disclosed unless the disclosure would violate 
the provisions of subsection (l)(a) through (f) of this section. (Emphasis added) 
Idaho Code § 9-335. 
The discussion of the Appellant in pages 15 through 21 of its brief notwithstanding, the 
CCP A has not cited to any authority that says that the mandatory language of the statute is not 
controlling. CCP A argues extensively that the "proper judicial interpretation of the Idaho PRA 
requires an analysis of the case law regarding the FOIA" (App. Brief., pp. 23-34). Appellant 
concludes the legislative history of the FOIA "provides evidence that Mr. Wade's request should 
be denied" (App. Brief., p. 28). Appellant contends that as the District Court failed to explore 
"any statutory definitions of "interference," the state or federal legislative history, or the wealth 
of federal case law on this topic" that the District Court's analysis was fatally flawed (App. 
Brief., p. 34). Though the CCPA provides a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the 
FOIA and how it is interpreted in various federal jurisdictions nation-wide, the CCP A fails to 
come to grips with well-established Idaho law regarding statutory interpretation that holds: 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free review." 
Magic Valley Newsps., Inc., 138 Idaho at 144, 59 P.3d at 315 (citing Lopez v. State, 
Indus. Spec. Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001)). "Interpretation of a 
statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words." Idaho Conserv. League, 
Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632, 634 (2006) (citing 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999)). "Where the language 
of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction." Id (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 
462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999)). (Emphasis added) 
Cowles Pub. Co. v. Kootenai County Bd of County Com 'rs, 144 Idaho 259,262, 159 
P.3d 896,899 (Idaho, 2007). 
The language of the Idaho Code Section 9-335 being plain and unambiguous, the District Court 
was correct in its analysis that the records requested by Mr. Wade were not exempt. Therefore, 
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the District Court did not err in ordering the disclosure of the requested records and was on point 
in making the following analysis: 
Respondents point out that the Canyon County Prosecutor's Office is a law enforcement 
agency under the language I.C. §9-335 and ifthese documents were disclosed it could 
interfere with enforcement proceedings, and/or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial, 
or an impartial adjudication. (Rpp.51-52) 
Indeed, the Petition for access to these records argues that all of the subject investigations 
have been completed. Further, Petitioner cites to a letter written by the Payette County 
Prosecuting Attorney declaring that her office was no longer in possession of the 
documents as they had been forwarded to the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
"[Ujpon completion of the Idaho State Police Investigation". Emphasis added. 
Nevertheless, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office continues to maintain 
that this remains on ongoing investigation even though over four and one-half months 
have gone by with no activity. I.C. § 9-335(3) clearly sets forth that an "inactive 
investigatory record shall be disclosed unless the disclosure would violate the provisions 
of subsection (1)( a) through (f)" of this code section. Emphasis added. The only 
provisions that the State claims are possibly applicable are (a) and (b). Thus, in order for 
this Court to find that the investigation file possessed by the (Rp.52) Canyon county 
Prosecuting Attorney is exempt from disclosure, it must find that disclosure will interfere 
with enforcement proceedings or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial 
adjudicatory hearing. (Rp.53) 
The only argument presented by the State to support such a finding is that disclosure 
would possibly taint the testimony of the Petitioner in a grand jury proceeding or 
preliminary hearing ... The language of the statute does not state that the records are 
exempt from disclosure if production might possibly interfere with enforcement 
proceedings. The statute requires that interference would result. This Court cannot make 
that finding. (Rpp.53, 100) 
The record clearly establishes the District Court was aware of its duty to act within 
established Idaho law. Rather than as suggested by the Appellant that it conduct an extensive 
analysis of foreign jurisdictions' applications ofthe FOIA in interpreting the Idaho Code Section 
9-335, the District Court ably explained that in making its determination as to the meaning of the 
statute, it was following established Idaho jurisprudence: 
In the analysis set forth above, the Court was attempting to follow the plain 
meaning of the statute. "The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative 
intent." Robison v.Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because 
the best guide to legislative intent is the words of the statute itself, "the interpretation of a 
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statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the 
statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written.'" Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892, 265 
P.3d 502, 505 (2011); citing State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003). The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed 
legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. Id. 
It is this Court's opinion that the statute clearly sets forth a requirement that 
disclosure of the relevant documents, to be exempt, must interfere with enforcement 
proceedings and/or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication. 
The pertinent language of the statute that this Court relies upon is "such exemption from 
disclosure applies only to the extent that the production of such records would: (a) 
Interfere with enforcement proceedings; (b) Deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial adjudication ... " I.C. § 9-335 (a) Emphasis added 
The State now cites subsections (1)( c) and (1)( e). These arguments were not 
made in opposition to the Petition at the original hearing and thus will not be considered. 
(R. p. 101) (Emphasis in the original text) 
11. The District Court's Granting of Mr. Wade's Request Did Not Serve as a Way 
Around Discovery. 
Mr. Wade filed his public writings request so that he would have information to file a 
complete and meaningful tort claim to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act (lTCA). The 
ITCA does not provide for a hearing in which a party can be compelled to produce documents to 
support a claimant's position or otherwise inform the claimant of facts that may weaken the 
claim. In short, the ITCA does not provide a discovery mechanism. Idaho Code Section 9-
343(3) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
Nothing contained in sections 9-337 through 9-348, Idaho Code, shall limit the 
availability of documents and records for discovery in the normal course of judicial or 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings, subject to the law and rules of evidence and of 
discovery governing such proceedings. Additionally, in any criminal appeal or post-
conviction civil action, sections 9-335 through 9-348, Idaho Code, shall not make 
available the contents of prosecution case files where such material has previously been 
provided to the defendant nor shall sections 9-335 through 9-348, Idaho Code, be 
available to supplement, augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures in any 
other federal, civil or administrative proceeding. (Emphasis added) 
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The only avenue available to Mr. Wade to bring or amend an existing tort claim with 
sufficient information held by the CCP A was to seek the information under the Idaho Public 
Writings Act. Mr. Wade's request was not an attempt to supplement, augment, substitute, or 
supplant discovery procedures in a civil or administrative proceeding. Through the filing of Mr. 
Wade's Petition for Access to Public Records, the Court was made aware that the reason Mr. 
Wade initiated his requests was to gain information that would allow Mr. Wade to submit a 
comprehensive tort claim (R., p.4). What the CCPA fails to understand is that it is of no 
significance that Mr. Wade specifically stated why he was making the public writings request. 
What is significant is that the Court applied the law without regard to Mr. Wade's desires. 
Rather, the Court applied the law as mandated by the Idaho Code Section 9-335 and applicable 
Idaho jurisprudence. 
3. The District Court Did Not Usurp the Discretion Allowed the CCPA by Creating a Filing 
Deadline. 
The IP AA argues that the District Court infringed upon the discretion of the CCP A by 
creating a filing deadline. This is the only assertion made by the CCP A and the IP AA that is not 
duplicative in their Appellant and Amicus briefs respectively. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. Respondent has previously addressed this argument in its PETITIONER'S RESPONSE 
TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT and incorporates the 
relevant portions of the latter herein as follows: 
During the May 4,2012, hearing, the Court did not order, insinuate, or say to the 
Respondent [Appellant] that it was giving Respondent[Appellant] two weeks to make a 
charging decision. Indeed, the Court provided the Respondent [Appellant] a thirteen (13) 
day period (May 13, 2012 - May 17, 2012) in which to review the files to ascertain 
which documents could be released to the Petitioner. On May 17, 2012, when the 
Respondent [Appellant] maintained it was not required to nor was Respondent 
[Appellant] inclined to provide Mr. Wade with any documents the Court made the 
decision to review the Respondent's [Appellant'] records in camera. Upon completion of 
that review, the Court issued its June 5, 2012, Memorandum Decision. Nowhere in the 
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Memorandum Decision did the Court state, nor in any way indicate that the 
Respondent[Appellant] was or had been limited to two (2) weeks from any defined time 
period to make a final charging decision. Indeed, a close review of the Memorandum 
Decision finds that the word "two" was only used one time in relation to the binders 
containing the Petitioner's medical records and the words "week" or "weeks" do not 
appear in the Memorandum Decision. Contrary to the assertion made by 
Respondent[Appllant], the Court in no way tried to force the Respondent to make a quick 
charging decision. Therefore, the Court did not "encroach upon the constitutionally 
mandated authority" of the Respondent [Appellant] as alleged in Respondent's 
[Appellant's] Memorandum. The Respondent's [Appellant's] position has no basis in fact 
or existing law. 
a. The Court Has Made No Determination Whom the Respondent Could Charge 
As noted by the Respondent [Appellant] and herein, on May 17, 2012, when the 
Respondent[Appellant], maintained it was not required to nor was Respondent[Appellant] 
inclined to provide Mr. Wade with any documents, the Court made the decision to review 
the Respondent's[Appellant's] records in camera. Upon completion of that review, the 
Court issued its June 5, 2012, Memorandum Decision. In that decision, the Court 
specifically stated the following: 
The only possible persons who might be placed on trial over this incident are the 
Petitioner Wade or the Fruitland Police Officer. Whether either person is charged 
with a crime is undecided. Indeed, the State may conclude that the evidence does 
not support a criminal charge against either party. But in the event a criminal 
charge is brought, this Court cannot find that disclosure of these documents would 
deprive either person of a fair trial or an impartial adjudication. 
The Court arrived at this opinion based on its in camera review and analysis of 
the record that existed at the time it was provided to the Court by the 
Respondent[Appellant]. The Court undertook and completed its in camera review to 
consider Mr. Wade's petition and the position taken by Respondent[Appellant] to deny 
the Petitioner access to the public writings requested by the Petitioner. There is nothing 
in the Court's language that remotely suggests that the Court restrained the 
Respondent [ Appellant] from charging anyone other than Officer Bill Copeland or Mr. 
Jamee Wade as Respondent[Appellant] deems appropriate as a result of the December 
22,2011, incident. 
(R., pp. 90-92). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that this Court decline to exercise 
jurisdiction in this appeal as the appeal is moot. Should this Court exercise its jurisdiction in this 
matter, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the District Court's Decision to grant 
Mr. Wade's Petition for Access to Public Records. Further given the following: 
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(a) That given the clear and unambiguous language of Idaho Code Section 9-335(1) 
and Idaho jurisprudence mandating how a Court must interpret a statute; 
(b) That the District Court properly performed its duty in applying the statute; 
(c) That Appellant's denial of the public records request was unjustified and 
frivolously pursued; and 
(d) That the Appellant with knowledge of pending litigation took no steps to ensure 
that the issues on appeal would not become moot. 
Respondent [utiher requests that he be granted his attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code Sections 9-335(4), 9-344(2), 12-121, and Id. R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1). 
DATED this 31 st day of January, 2013. 
CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LA W GROUP 
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